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Do spatial socioeconomic features influence a digital behaviour like cyberhate? Our 
contribution provides an answer to this question, showing how high levels of income in-
equality determine high volumes of hate tweets in Italy. Our findings are robust to poten-
tial endogeneity problems of income inequality, as well as to the inclusion of confounding 
factors and to competing estimation strategies. Additionally, we find that education does 
not act as a protective factor against cyberhate in unequal places, aligning with existing evi-
dence showing that inequality may trigger intolerance, including among educated people, 
threatening the perceived stability of social positions. Also, in the Italian case, the per-
ception of economic insecurity fuels cyberhate, alongside the transmission of self-interest 
values along family generations. The latter finding relates to existing evidence supporting 
the role of persistent social norms in shaping people’s attitudes.
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Introduction
Online hate, also labelled as ‘cyberhate’, is a 
fast-growing phenomenon. Data show that, 
in the European Union, more than 75% of 
Internet users witnessed some sort of on-
line hate speech on digital social platforms 
(Eurobarometer, 2016); in the USA, the share 
is about 66% (Duggan, 2017). Contrary to 
common belief, the data also show that the 
majority of cyberhate comes from people un-
related to any organised hate group (Hall, 
2013). This worrying trend has pushed online 
hate up the research (Müller et al., 2018; Silva 
et  al., 2016) and policy (Gagliardone et  al., 
2015) agenda.
Despite the growing interest in cyberhate, 
little is known about what really drives it, in 
particular about the under-investigated re-
lationship with the geography of income in-
equality that is the focus of the present paper. 
Qualitative studies provide descriptive evi-
dence on the association between cyberhate 
and several other spatial features, such as crime 
and voting (Bernatzky, Costello and Hawdon, 
2021; Görzig, Milosevic and Staksrud, 2017), 
suggesting that space matters in shaping this 
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quantitative evidence confirms the role of 
space, detailing the effect of the geography 
of unemployment (Anderson, Crost and 
Rees, 2020), human capital (Chan, 2019) and 
pandemic shocks (Lu and Sheng, 2020) on 
cyberhate. Overall, these contributions suggest 
that relevant risk factors for cyberhate belong 
to the socioeconomic context. The aim of the 
paper is to contribute to this strand of litera-
ture by adding evidence on income inequality, 
focussing on the production of hate tweets 
in Italy.
The effect of income inequality on cyberhate 
appears to be particularly salient in light of 
the mounting evidence showing that higher in-
equality relates to ‘close-but-different’ behav-
iours with regard to cyberhate. According to 
existing work, inequality shapes the observed 
patterns of political discontent (Burgoon et al., 
2019; Dijkstra, Poelman and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2019; Engler and Weisstanner, 2020; Martin 
et  al., 2018; McCann, 2020; Rodríguez-Pose, 
2018), and several discriminatory violent be-
haviours such as racial school bullying and vio-
lence against minorities (Decelles and Norton, 
2016; Elgar et  al., 2013; Kunst et  al., 2017; 
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2017).
Our results support the idea that income in-
equality matters in fostering cyberhate, even 
after controlling for the spatial features that 
are already known to have potentially com-
peting effects, such as crime, unemployment 
and immigration. Additionally, we find that the 
interaction between economic inequality and 
education is positively related to an increase 
in cyberhate. This counterintuitive finding 
parallels the existing evidence showing that 
educated people display more intolerant be-
haviours than less educated people in situations 
characterised by inequality (Jetten et al., 2017; 
Kunstman, Plant and Deska, 2016; LeBlanc, 
Beaton and Walker, 2015; Sharma, 2015). It 
is also consistent with evidence from Italy 
outlining non-negligible levels of bias against 
immigrants among educated groups as showed 
by Alesina et  al. (2018) in the assessment of 
prejudices among Italian teachers. This relates 
to recent findings detailing how the effect of 
education on hate varies by country (Finseraas, 
Skorge and Strøm, 2018; Weber, 2020), with evi-
dence showing a protective effect of education 
in some places, but not in others. Finally, we 
find that economic insecurity and social norms 
promoting self-interest act as risk factors for 
cyberhate, whereas neither crime nor immi-
grants have meaningful association with it.
Overall, the economic dimension is rele-
vant in shaping cyberhate, in line with many 
hate-studies (that is, Gerstenfeld, 2017; 
Green, Mcfalls and Smith, 2001; Stephan and 
Stephan, 2000). The evidence provided by our 
paper is important for policy, since it identifies 
which factors should be addressed to counter 
cyberhate and shows that some of these could 
be tackled and/or alleviated without imposing 
a regulation interfering with the fundamental 
right to freedom of speech (McGonagle, 
2013).
We focus on the case of Italy for both prac-
tical and theoretical reasons. First, Italy is 
one of the most unequal countries among the 
Western European countries (Eurostat, 2019) 
and it experiences volumes of online hate far 
higher than the European average. Nearly 80% 
of Italian internet users witnessed some sort of 
online hate speech (SWG, 2017). Second, we 
have very detailed data on cyberhate in Italy, 
consisting of more than 75,000 geo-referenced 
hate tweets collected in 2017 (Musto et  al., 
2016), which we merged with administrative 
data on the 611 Italian Local Labour Market 
Areas (LLMAs). Estimating a two-part model 
(2PM) and a Control Function with Two-Stage 
Residual Inclusion (CF-TSRI), we find that 
the volume of cyberhate is determined by in-
come inequality, even when we control for 
other potential confounding factors and for 
endogeneity issues. The results appear robust 
to alternative model specifications (single-
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selection model [SSM]), as well as to a series of 
other robustness checks.
Our contribution builds on previous re-
search along several dimensions. First, our 
results contribute to the build-up of the em-
pirical evidence targeting the links between 
places and cyberhate, as called for by hate 
scholars (Gagliardone et  al., 2015). Our 
findings provide quantitative support for 
the role of the socio-economic dimension, 
adding income inequality as relevant deter-
minant for cyberhate to the existing evidence 
on unemployment, shocks and education 
(Anderson, Crost and Rees, 2020; Chan, 2019; 
Lu and Sheng, 2020). Second, our results re-
late to the literature detailing the strong role 
of places in shaping resentment (Abreu and 
Öner, 2020; Billing, McCann and Ortega-
Argilés, 2019), adding evidence on the specific 
behaviour of cyberhate. Third, this investiga-
tion refers to the thriving research on the role 
of inequality in influencing resentful conducts 
(Burgoon et al., 2019; Côté, House and Willer, 
2015; Engler and Weisstanner, 2020; Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2017), by adding evidence on 
cyberhate. Fourth, our findings also relate 
to novel evidence suggesting that the effects 
of education in promoting tolerance entail a 
relevant country-specific dimension (Alesina 
et al., 2018; Finseraas, Skorge and Strøm, 2018; 
Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015), which can be in-
fluenced by the level of inequality (Piff and 
Moskowitz, 2017; Wodtke, 2016). Fifth, given 
the focus on the role of spatial geographies on 
online hate, the paper contributes to the de-
bate on the role of places in the ICT-driven 
world, showing that places actually matter in 
shaping online behaviours.
The remainder of the paper is organised as 
follows. Section Drivers of online hate speech 
describes cyberhate, its potential association 
with economic inequality and with other spa-
tial features. The Results section introduces the 
data and the empirical strategy. Results are pre-
sented and discussed in the Discussion section. 
Finally, the fifth section concludes.
Drivers of online hate speech
Online hate speech: definition, 
characteristics and spatial risk factors
Online hate speech is defined as: ‘words or 
symbols diffused through the Internet, that are 
derogatory and/or intimidating on the basis 
of race, religion, sexual orientation, and so on’ 
(McGonagle, 2013). Currently, it is one of the 
challenges posed by the extensive use of social 
media (European Commission, 2018; OSCE-
ODIHR, 2010). The impact of cyberhate on 
victims can be devastating and durable, due to 
hyperlinking, online searchability and content 
shared by users (Sunstein, 2017). Online hate 
is extremely pervasive and it becomes public 
and available to a potentially global audi-
ence without either mediation or cost. In 2018, 
Facebook removed around 7.9 million pieces 
of content related to hate speech worldwide 
(Facebook, 2019), and YouTube cancelled more 
than 160 channels per day globally (Youtube, 
2019); Twitter has deleted nearly 2.5 million 
tweets for hateful contents in 2019 (Twitter, 
2019). The relevance of cyberhate is confirmed 
also by the ongoing trend towards law enforce-
ment to counter it (Assimakopoulos et  al., 
2017). Online hate occupies a prominent pos-
ition also in numerous research fields, from 
computer science and criminology to eco-
nomics and psychology (Gagliardone et  al., 
2015; Müller et al., 2018; Silva et al., 2016), and 
it is classified as a stand-alone resentful op-
pressive behaviour, structurally different from 
offline hate (ElSherief et al., 2018; Hine et al., 
2016; Müller et al., 2018).
Evidence shows that real-world social and 
moral norms which are effective in moderating 
real-world hate have a remarkably weak grip 
in countering online hate (Lowry et al., 2016). 
This is due to several reasons. First, cyberhate is, 
by definition, created online, where people ag-
gregate in homogeneous clusters (Himelboim 
et al., 2013). By creating these virtual in-groups, 
users reinforce their extant social group iden-
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defined as closed systems where stereotypes 
and prejudices are amplified and reinforced 
(Sunstein, 2017). Overall, the distance between 
ethnic/cultural groups increases. Second, there 
is a widespread uncritical acceptance of infor-
mation found on the internet, which further 
reinforces prejudice and social identity (Hall, 
2013). Third, the online hatemongers experi-
ence an ‘online disinhibition effect’ (Suler, 2004) 
that lessens their sense of accountability and 
moderation (Citron et al., 2011) and lowers the 
effect of real-world social barriers in countering 
aggressive and radical behaviours (ElSherief 
et  al., 2018; Sunstein, 2017). The ‘online disin-
hibition effect’ results from a perceived sense of 
anonymity experienced by many online users 
(Perry et al., 2009).
Although more shielded from real-world so-
cial norms, cyberhate does not happen in a spa-
tial vacuum (Castells, 2001; Hall, 2013), since 
hatemongers are grounded in a spatial milieu. 
Cross-country descriptive evidence outlines 
place-specific heterogeneity in cyberhate, also 
when controlling for individual characteristics 
(Näsi et al., 2017). Qualitative evidence shows 
that spatial features—such as crime, unemploy-
ment, social capital and hate events—relate to 
online hate (Bernatzky, Costello and Hawdon, 
2021; Costello and Hawdon, 2018; Görzig, 
Milosevic and Staksrud, 2017; Kaakinen et al., 
2018; Kowalski, Limber and McCord, 2019). 
Novel quantitative evidence provides further 
support on the influence of local features on 
cyberhate. Anderson et  al. (2020) show that 
US counties with higher levels of unemploy-
ment display higher shares of cyberhate. Chan 
(2019) finds a correlation between the local en-
dowment of educated people and cyberhate, 
again in the USA (but provide no support for 
a causal link). Lu and Sheng (2020) identify a 
causal link between the local spread of Covid-
19 and cyberhate.
This growing evidence gives room to further 
analyse the relationship between cyberhate 
and places. We contribute to this investiga-
tion providing evidence on the role of income 
inequality, given the broad empirical literature 
bears out a strong association between income 
inequality and other anti-social attitudes, but 
there is a lack of quantitative analysis specific-
ally targeting cyberhate.
Income inequality and online hate
Evidence shows that income inequality relates 
to resentment, racial school bullying and vio-
lence against minorities.
Income inequality strongly predicts voting 
for parties proposing anti-immigrant/anti-
global platforms (Burgoon et al., 2019; Engler 
and Weisstanner, 2020; Gest, Reny and Mayer, 
2018). Discontent expessed in the ballot box 
also relates to territorial socioeconomic in-
equality, as detailed in the growing bulk of 
literature on the ‘places that don’t matter’ 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2018, 2020). Observed pat-
terns of resentment expressed in the ballot 
box are associated with the geographical im-
balance between places that thrive from glo-
balisation and places that feel left-behind 
(Billing, McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2019; 
Dijkstra, Poelman and Rodríguez-Pose, 2019; 
Iammarino, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2019; 
Martin et al., 2018; McCann, 2020).
Cross-country evidence shows a strong as-
sociation between inequality and several dis-
criminatory behaviours: racial school bullying 
(Elgar et al., 2013), lack of empathy and soli-
darity towards minorities, scapegoating and 
homophobia (Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Côté, 
House and Willer, 2015; Layte and Whelan, 
2014; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2017). Data from 
the US details how higher levels of inequality 
relate to more hate, triggering racism, sexism, 
opposition to social welfare and violent acts 
against minorities (Kunst et al., 2017).
We build on these findings with our inves-
tigation on the effect of income inequality on 
cyberhate in Italy. Specifically, we focus our 
analysis on disposable income inequality. Our 
starting point is the assessment of the measure 
of association between disposable income 
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other confounding factors that are related to 
cyberhate according to the existing literature. 
A detailed description of these competing spa-
tial factors is provided in the next subsection.
We also explore whether the effect of dis-
posable income inequality on cyberhate 
changes depending on the local share of edu-
cated people, given the mixed evidence on this. 
Experimental evidence from Australia, Canada, 
USA and India outline that more educated 
people display more intolerant behaviours 
when economic inequality is higher (Decelles 
and Norton, 2016; Kunstman, Plant and Deska, 
2016; LeBlanc, Beaton and Walker, 2015; 
Sharma, 2015). Scholars explain these findings 
through the ‘fear of falling’ effect triggered 
by income inequality (Jetten et  al., 2017). In 
other words, income inequality makes higher-
status people more concerned about losing 
their privileged position, pushing them to de-
velop legitimising frames for scapegoating dis-
empowered groups (Lick, Alter and Freeman, 
2018; Piff and Moskowitz, 2017; Wodtke, 2016). 
The evidence supporting the ‘fear of falling’ 
effect in some countries is in sharp contrast to 
the findings in other countries, where higher 
educated people are more tolerant towards mi-
norities (Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; Lancee 
and Sarrasin, 2015) in unequal places as well 
(Korndörfer, Egloff and Schmukle, 2015). 
This evidence supports education as a way 
for better framing the threats faced by society 
and internalising equality values (Cavaille and 
Marshall, 2019). Given these contrasting results, 
which effect prevails in a given country appears 
to be a matter for empirical investigation.
Recent works scrutinising the influence 
of education on hate provides support for 
country-specific effects. Data from Switzerland 
shows that higher educated individuals become 
more likely to have discriminatory attitudes 
when they enter the labour market (Lancee 
and Sarrasin, 2015) and evidence from Italy in-
dicates that an educated group, such as teachers, 
display strong negative stereotypes towards 
immigrant students to the point of influencing 
marking (Alesina et  al., 2018). Empirical evi-
dence shows little support for high levels of 
education in decreasing hate also in Germany 
(Weber, 2020), Norway (Finseraas, Skorge 
and Strøm, 2018), UK, Sweden (Cavaille and 
Marshall, 2019) and the USA (Wodtke, 2016). 
Data from experimental games targeting USA 
and UK indicates that people with high educa-
tional attainment display a stronger individual-
istic behaviour (Manstead, 2018), and reduced 
empathy and trust (Kraus, Côté and Keltner, 
2010), after controlling for personality traits. At 
the same time, there is broad and established 
evidence on education as having an effective 
impact in countering hate at the European level 
(i.a. d׳Hombres and Nunziata, 2016; Rooduijn, 
2018), and in several countries including France 
and the Netherlands (Cavaille and Marshall, 
2019). Qualitative evidence suggests that edu-
cation counters the perception of economic 
threats, but it is less effective in countering the 
perception of a sociocultural threat (Schmuck 
and Matthes, 2015), relating to the fear of losing 
social status.
The observed cross-country heterogeneity 
on the effects of education and of its interaction 
with income inequality on attitudes towards 
minorities suggests that the effect which pre-
vails in a given country is a matter for empir-
ical investigation (Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; 
Finseraas, Skorge and Strøm, 2018), which we 
pursue, in the present paper, for Italy.
Finally, we also account for the potential re-
verse causality in the measure of association 
between income inequality and cyberhate, re-
ferring to the literature addressing income in-
equality and public bads (Enamorado et  al., 
2016). The public bad nature of cyberhate may 
stimulate selective outmigration of affluent 
people from places characterised by high level 
of intolerance and this potential bias might af-
fects our findings. To account for this, we adopt 
an instrumental variable approach, exploiting 
a Bartik-type exogenous regressor following 
established contributions on endogeneity 
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Ferreira, 2015; Boustan, Ferreira, Winkler and 
Eric M. Zolt, 2013; Enamorado et al., 2016).
Other spatial features related to 
cyberhate
Existing studies detail several spatial features 
capable of influencing cyberhate production 
besides inequality, which we describe below. 
We will include them in our empirical inves-
tigation as control variables to assess the ro-
bustness of our results and to contribute to the 
information base on the role of spatial features 
on cyberhate, with evidence from Italy.
Family is an interesting element to consider 
given its focal imprinting on the spatial geog-
raphies of the transmission of equality/non-
equality value (Alesina et  al., 2021; Bertocchi 
a et al., 2019; Duranton et al., 2009) and the ac-
knowledged role of non-equality values in re-
ducing solidarity (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2017). 
In accounting for the geography of value trans-
mission through family, we rely on the estab-
lished classification of family types by Todds 
(1990), who identified an organising principle 
for the classification of family types along the 
equality/inequality dimension based on the 
relationship between siblings in the family, as 
shaped by what happens to family property 
after the death of the parents. Equality is said 
to be strongest where family property is div-
ided most evenly between siblings, whereas 
it is weakest when one particular child (often 
the eldest) is favoured at the expense of the 
others. Areas in which equal familial systems 
are operating are identified, therefore, by in-
heritance laws and practices. The classifica-
tion of family types identifies two egalitarian 
family types—communitarian and egalitarian 
nuclear—and two non-egalitarian family 
types—stem and incomplete stem (Todds, 1990). 
Non-egalitarian family types are identified by 
the self-interest dimension enforced through in-
dividualistic standards. All four types of family 
are present in the Italian context (Duranton 
et al., 2009). Notably, the classification of family 
types along this dimesion has already been ac-
knowledged as capable of influencing relevant 
socioeconomic outcomes (Duranton et  al., 
2009). The same individualistic standards chan-
nelled by the non-egalitarian family types are 
also recognised within social psychology as a 
booster for social anxiety and violence, since 
they increase the relevance of preserving the 
existing social status from potential threats 
(Wilkinson et al., 2017). Thus, we bridge these 
two strands of literature by assessing whether 
self-interest values transmitted through non-
egalitarian family types influences online hate.
Perceived competition for scarce resources, 
such as jobs and welfare, can act as triggers for 
hateful behaviour (Green et al., 2001; Stephan 
et al., 2000). Experimental evidence shows that 
perceived scarcity brought about by economic 
hardship affects people’s representations of 
minorities fostering discrimination (Krosch 
and Amodio, 2014; Krosch, Tyler and Amodio, 
2017), and quantitative evidence identifies un-
employment and the perception of job precar-
iousness as determinants of online hate in the 
USA (Anderson, Crost and Rees, 2020). The 
perception of job precariousness is particulary 
interesting in our analysis, given that data from 
Italy acknowledges that its role in influencing 
people’s discontent and behaviours is more 
relevant than fluctuations in actual employ-
ment figures (Boeri and Brandolini, 2005; 
Modena, Rondinelli and Sabatini, 2014; OECD, 
2018).
Social capital can influence cyberhate, 
since lower levels of trust promote discon-
nectedness among different social groups 
(Gerstenfeld, 2017). Conversely, high levels of 
trust strengthen the adherence to social norms 
and promote pro-social solidaristic behaviours 
(Andriani and Sabatini, 2015). Collaboration 
favours openess towards diverse groups. Cross-
country evidence supports a negative asso-
ciation between offline trust and cyberhate 
(Kaakinen et al., 2018), whereas the descriptive 
findings on the association between cyberhate 
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2020; Kaakinen et  al., 2018), probably due to 
the nature of collaboration (among people 
belonging to the same social group or among 
people belonging to different social groups).
We also consider crime, since it is one of the 
main sources for social tension and distress 
(Dustmann and Fasani, 2016; Pinotti, 2015; ) 
and qualitative evidence suggests an associ-
ation with cyberhate (Görzig, Milosevic and 
Staksrud, 2017). Similarly, foreign population 
and refugees might work as a risk factor for 
cyberhate, since immigrants may be perceived 
as a threat to the sociocultural identity of the 
locals (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 
2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) and 
immigrants are one of the main targets of 
cyberhate (OSCE-ODIHR, 2019). Votes for 
anti-minorities political platforms are a rele-
vant proxy for the social unrest determined by 
the geography of winners and losers from glo-
balisation (Martin et al., 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 
2020). Novel qualitative evidence on cyberhate 
indicates that this form of unrest may fuel on-
line hate narratives occurring in the same areas 
(Bernatzky, Costello and Hawdon, 2021). By 
the same argument, real-world hate crimes 
constitute another potential risk factor, by con-
tributing to legitimising online anti-minorities 
behaviours, as also suggested by recent quali-
tative evidence (Costello and Hawdon, 2018).
Data
We measure cyberhate using the corpus of 
Twitter geo-referenced data extracted through 
a system of algorithms designed by Musto et al. 
(2016) and used to design the Italian Hate Map,1 
in turn inspired by the Humboldt University 
Hate Map targeting the USA.2 The database 
contains more than 75,000 tweets generated in 
Italy in 2017 and identified through data extrac-
tion algorithms targeting semantic processing, 
sentiment analysis and content classification. 
By hate tweet we refer to sentences posted 
on Twitter containing at least one derogatory 
term used in a violent and/or derogatory way 
against people on the basis of ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, gender or disability. The corpus of 
hate tweets has been designed through several 
steps, consistent with the computer-science lit-
erature on hate tweet detection (i.a. Burnap 
and Williams, 2014; Himelboim, Mccreery and 
Smith, 2013). First, a set of 47 sensible terms is 
identified for the following intolerance dimen-
sions: homophobia, racism, violence, disability, 
anti-Semitism, gender. Second, an algorithm 
extracting the Italian tweets containing at least 
one of the sensible terms is launched, extracting 
tweets for 10 months. Third, the extracted tweets 
are analysed to remove non-intolerant tweets, 
that is, tweets that contain a sensible term but 
used in a non-hateful message. This third part dis-
cards those tweets that are characterised by neu-
tral and positive sentiment, leaving only tweets 
with at least one sensible term and a negative 
sentiment against minorities. Fourth, of the re-
maining tweets those which are geo-tagged are 
retained (Musto et  al., 2015). This multi-stage 
process is necessary to discard false positives.
Although capturing only a part of cyberhate, 
Twitter is a valuable source, being widely used 
to propagate hate, as well as being character-
ised for having public content that can be re-
trieved and analysed (ElSherief et  al., 2018; 
Himelboim et al., 2013). We aggregate the hate 
tweets at Local Labour Market Area (LLMA) 
and normalise them by the total tweets gen-
erated.3 Figure 1 portrays the resulting geog-
raphy. The 611 Italian LLMAs divide Italy in 
functional areas based on commuting, hence 
containing the bulk of the labour force living 
and working there. They are particularly suit-
able to our study because they alleviate the un-
feasibility in detecting whether the tweets are 
posted during working time, commuting time 
or leisure time. Hate-related tweet extraction 
does not include the general flow of tweets, 
which we measure using the Cheng et al. (2011) 
Twitter corpus, up to now the largest and finest-
grained geo-tagged Twitter database available.
We measure disposable income inequality 
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To account for concerns on the endogeneity 
of disposable income inequality, later we 
introduce an instrumental variable to predict 
the income distribution of LLMA i at time t 
using 16-year lagged information on the local 
disposable income distribution and national 
growth rate for each income bin. This Bartik-
type instrument for the Gini index of income 
inequality has been introduced by Boustan 
et al. (2013) and further applied in the litera-
ture addressing the endogeneity bias of income 
inequality (Baum-Snow and Ferreira, 2015; 
Enamorado et al., 2016).
To measure the local transmission of 
either egalitarian or non-egalitarian values, 
we map the geography of egalitarian and 
non-egalitarian families following Duranton 
et  al. (2009) on the Italian LLMAs. Within 
the economic dimension, we consider proxy 
economic insecurity with a measure for job 
precariousness given the salience of this fea-
tures on several behavioural outcomes for 
Italians. We consider the share of workers 
feeling insecure about being able to keep their 
job (ISTAT, 2016).
We account for the other potentially con-
founding factors acknowledged by the lit-
erature. For the demographic dimension, we 
consider the share of resident migrants, the 
geography of refugee hosting centres, non-
hate and hate crime. On the social dimen-
sion, we measure trust through the voting 
turnout at the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, and collaboration through the 
number of non-for-profit local units and 
through vaccine coverage that proxies for 
the attitude of putting collective needs be-
fore individual needs (WHO, 2018; Wolfe, 
2002; Kennedy, 2019). Political preferences 
for anti-immigrant parties are captured by 
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the share of votes for right-wing parties in 
the 2014 European Parliament elections. 
The empirical investigation also controls 
for population size, population density, the 
share of disrupted families and central vs 
marginalised areas. Summary statistics for 
the considered variables are included in 
Table 1,4 the data description and the data 
sources are in Supplementary Table A.1 and 
A.2.
Empirical modelling
Our baseline model specification focuses on 
the correlation between income inequality 
and the share of geotagged online hate tweets 
generated in 2017 across the 611 Italian 
LLMAs. The database is cross-sectional and 
the dependent variable, given by the share 
of geo-tagged hate tweets on total geo-
tagged tweets produced in each LLMA, is 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Geography of hate tweets      
 Onlinehate tweets 1 0.000663 0.00185 0 0.0261
 Volume of total tweets 1 0.858 0.350 0 1
Economic characteristics      
 Human capital 611 10.28096 2.737488 3.578903 21.07972
 Gini index 611 41.135 2.866571 33.47302 54.87072
 Company failures 611 12.43 5.680 1 30.10
 Overdue payments 611 23.45 11.47 4.400 48
 Perception of job security 611 5.473344 0.7065942 3.571887 7.629317
Sociocultural features      
 Foreign resident population 611 5.799721 3.777264 0.2714932 16.39703
 Split population 611 3.770977 1.509572 0.7702183 8.319397
 Aging index 611 16.69316 4.646057 6.93617 34.9384
 Population density 611 2.056063 2.915807 0.1041765 31.07485
 Population 611 0.09727 0.25829 0.314 3.6851
Geographic characteristics      
 Distance from closest refugees’ hosting facility in 2010 611 3.6711 2.8916 0.0777543 19.23096
 Hub in the LLMA 611 0.3698854 0.483169 0 1
 Central Area 611 0.3927987 0.4887728 0 1
Social structures      
 Social networks 611 5.528334 2.32694 0.9486006 14.95564
 Trust 611 56.41075 12.89531 25.47039 85.69295
 Family types 611 1.92144 1.275384 1 4
Deviant behaviours      
 Crime 611 19.93512 7.503294 7.467119 55.05622
 Offline hate 611 0.270 0.444 0 1
 Gambling availability 611 2.242603 0.6932691 0. 340329 5.066981
 Measles vaccine coverage 611 93.96 3.659 82 100
Political preferences      
 Right parties votes 611 27.23696 8.619548 5.359276 55.28928
 Left parties votes 611 44.17219 9.47298 9.82249 73.67038
 5-Star votes 611 20.27569 5.679561 1.990223 38.42243
 Center parties votes 611 6.647648 5.036799 0.2094972 48.85226
Exclusion restrictions (SSM)      
 No internet age index 611 3.716 1.134 1.372 8.266
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continuous with a non-negligible share of 
zero (as shown in Supplementary Figure A.1). 
The share of hate tweets displays a substan-
tial skewness, with a long thin right tail (also 
see Supplementary Figure A.1). We assume 
that the zeros in the outcome variable are not 
driven by any selection bias; hence, there are 
only true zero observations.
Given this assumption, our preferred mod-
elling strategy is a 2PM. First, we estimate 
the occurrence of hate tweets by means of a 
probit model for the first part Pr(onlinehate > 
0); second, we estimate a log-normal model 
for hate tweets given that some hate tweets 
are present, E(ln onlinehate |onlinehate>0), 
where log-normality accounts for correcting 
the right-skewness of the dependent vari-
able once the condition onlinehate >0 is ap-
plied (Cameron et  al., 2010). Formally, let 
ln onlinehate be the log of the share of hate 
tweets on total tweets in each LLMA in 
2017 and let z be the binary indicator of 
positive online hate events such that z = 1 if 
onlinehate > 0 and z = 0 if onlinehate = 0. Then, 
for onlinehate > 0, f (ln onlinehate| z = 1) is the 
conditional density of ln onlinehate. Hence, the 
2PM can be summarised as follows:
f (ln onlinehate | X) =®
Pr(z = 0|X), if onlinehate = 0
Pr (z = 1 | X) f (ln onlinehate|z = 1, X), if onlinehate > 0
 (1)
zi =α+ β1GINIi + β2EDUi + β3GINIi × EDUi
+ β4FAMi + β5INSi + β6 Ω i + ϕi + εi
 (2)
lnonlinehatei =δ + γ1GINIi + γ2EDUi + γ3GINIi×
EDUi + γ4FAMi + γ5INSi+
γ6 Ω i + µi + ui
 (3)
where equation (1) summarises both stages 
of the 2PM, equation (2) is the stage 1 probit 
model and equation (3) the stage 2 log-linear 
regression. In equations (2) and (3), GINIi is the 
Gini coefficient measuring disposable income 
inequality in LLMA i, EDUi is the share of 
educated people in the same LLMA, FAMi is 
the family type characterising the LLMA and 
INSi is the perception of economic insecurity. 
In both stages we consider the interaction be-
tween income inequality and the share of edu-
cated people to measure whether the latter 
serves as moderator for the effect of income 
inequality. Ω i contains other potential con-
trol variables. Both stages include a regional 
fixed effect, respectively ϕi in the probit and 
µi in the log-linear regression. εi and ui are the 
error terms. Province, instead of regional, fixed 
effects are included in the robustness checks. 
The independent processes of the 2PM allow 
for the flexibility of having different regressors 
in the two equations. We exploit this feature 
by testing the same broad set of controls in 
Ω i in both stages, which we assess through 
postestimation diagnostics to identify the rele-
vant ones in each stage.
However, the 2PM model does suffer from 
possible endogeneity issues, due to reverse 
causality, omitted variables and/or measure-
ment errors. To solve this endogeneity problem, 
we adopt a CF-TSRI approach (Stock, 2001; 
Terza, 2017; Wooldridge, 2015).
The CF-TSRI approach estimates a 
reduced-form equation where the potentially 
endogenous variable, that is, income inequality, 
is regressed against an extra regressor and Ω i. 
The extra-regressor is built, for the reduced-
form equation, instrumenting the Gini index 
with the synthetic inequality measure ex-
pressed through the Bartik-type regressor ac-
cording to the literature (Boustan, Ferreira, 
Winkler and Eric M Zolt, 2013; Enamorado 
et al., 2016). In practical terms, we start with 
the initial (2001) average household income 
by local quintile and LLMAs. We then esti-
mate to which national percentile of the in-
come distribution each local income quintile 
belongs to in the initial year. Then, we allow 
the income of each local quantile to grow over 
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We argue that the instrument satisfies the 
exclusion restriction since the 2001 local in-
come distribution is the only source for its 
cross-sectional variation and it is more than 
16-year lagged with respect to the year for 
which we have data on hate tweets, 6-year 
lagged with respect to the first-ever-sent Tweet 
and 3-year lagged from the first Facebook 
profile. It is also 8-year lagged with respect to 
hate events turning non-sporadic in the country 
(Lunaria, 2019). Therefore, the instrument ap-
pears to be capable of mitigating concerns 
about anticipation effects on future streams of 
hate tweets and overall tweets as well as it can 
alleviate concern about sorting and migration 
of the population due to preferences with re-
spect to hate. The reduced-form residuals are 
then plugged into the structural equation to-
gether with the endogenous explanatory vari-
able and Ω i.
Results
Baseline 2PM model
Table 2 summarises the findings from the base-
line 2PM specification. Among family types, 
the egalitarian nuclear family is used as base 
category and therefore not included. Columns 
1–2 report the estimates of stage 1 of the 2PM, 
where we assess the risk factors associated with 
the occurrence of online hate at local level, with 
and without the inclusion of the interaction be-
tween income inequality and education among 
regressors (for the detailed estimation results, 
see columns 1–2 in Supplementary Table A.3). 
The results show that neither income inequality 
nor its interaction with educated people, are 
associated with the occurrence of cyberhate. 
Whereas educated people and the local per-
ception of job insecurity are risk factors for 
the occurrence of online hate. The increase of 
1 percentage point in the perception of job in-
security (that is, keeping the current job for the 
next 6 months) is related to an increase greater 
than 0.55 in the occurrence of cyberhate. This 
result holds when we consider data on the 
perception of job insecurity at a different point 
in time (see column 2 in Supplementary Table 
A.3). The share of educated people is positively 
associated to the occurrence of cyberhate. We 
have tested several interactions between edu-
cated people and other variables, but none are 
significant. Similarly, we tested the interaction 
between inequality and the perception of job 
insecurity and find it non-significant. As for 
family types, the prevalence of non-egalitarian 
family types is associated with an increase in 
the occurrence of cyberhate, as shown by the 
positive coefficients of both stem and incom-
plete stem families. The presence of the egali-
tarian family type is instead a protective factor 
for the occurrence of online hate (negative 
coefficient of the communitarian family type). 
The local shares for right-wing parties display a 
small and positive association to the occurrence 
of cyberhate. Finally, neither crime nor immi-
grants are significant. These findings hold also 
with a wide array of robustness checks which 
we detail later on.
Columns 3–6 report the findings from stage 
2, where the outcome is the ‘intensity’ (and 
not simply the occurrence) of hate tweets 
(Supplementary Table A.8). Estimates in 
columns 3, 5 and 6 show that high levels of 
income inequality are associated with high 
volumes of hate tweets, including when con-
trol variables are included. In column 4, we 
present the estimates when the Gini index is 
not included among regressors to show that 
an increase in the share of educated people 
is positively associated with an increase in 
cyberhate intensity. Column 5 shows the es-
timates when both educated people and the 
Gini index are included. Results from col-
umns 3–6 show that the direct effects of both 
income inequality and education are positive 
and significant and that a higher level of in-
equality (for example, Gini index 0.01 higher) 
is related to a 5-p.p. change in hate tweets. 
Column 6 reports the estimates of the inter-
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The estimates support the significance 
of an indirect effect of income inequality 
channelled by the share of educated people 
in the LLMA, as shown by the positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction 
term.6 Figure 2a describes the effect of the 
interaction between income inequality and 
educated people on the intensity of hate 
tweets summarising the predictive margins. 
Interacting with higher inequality, human 
capital endowment relates to higher inten-
sity of cyberhate as portrayed by the upward 
slopes. These results are robust to several ro-
bustness checks. Overall, we find that income 
inequality acts as a significant risk factor for 
the intensity of online hate.
CF-TSRI model for the endogeneity of 
income inequality
The 2PM estimates show correlation, but not 
necessarily causation, between inequality and 
cyberhate. In fact, they do not account for pos-
sible endogeneity problems. To account for 
Table 2. 2PM results
2PM stage 1: probit model (y = online hate: Y/N) 2PM stage 2: log-linear model (y = share of online hate in logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 coef coef  coef coef coef coef
Job Insecurity 0.559*** 0.556***      
 (0.128) (0.135)      
Educated People 0.159*** 0.161*** Educated People  0.495*** 0.273*** 0.260***
 (0.051) (0.049)   (0.036) (0.039) (0.041)
Gini index 0.346 0.119 Gini index 15.943***  5.002** 5.784**
 (0.263) (1.307)  (3.208)  (1.983) (2.541) 
Educated People  0.0281 Educated People    1.570**
*Gini index  (0.165) *Gini index    (0.587)
Incomplete Stem Family 5.466*** 5.422*** Incomplete Stem Family 0.886*** 0.227** 0.306 0.361
(Non-Egalitarian) (0.694) (0.715) (Non-Egalitarian) (0.119) (0.074) (0.083) (0.756)
Stem Family  
(Non-Egalitarian)
5.142*** 4.834*** Stem Family  
(Non-Egalitarian)
1.405*** 0.442 0.596 0.653
 (1.027) (1.103)  (0.093) (0.320) (0.161) (0.667) 
Communitarian −0.793* −0.776* Communitarian 0.294 0.478 0.319 0.823 
Family (Egalitarian) (0.422) (0.436) Family (Egalitarian) (0.303) (0.387) (0.296) (0.934)
Right parties’ votes 0.0343** 0.0348**      
 (0.021) (0.0165)      
Crime rate 0.189 0.192 Crime rate 0.524 0.619 0.599 0.555
 (0.414) (0.418)  (0.307) (0.429) (0.315) (0.339)
Foreign population −0.0560 −0.0568 Foreign population −0.007 −0.008 −0.0033 −0.0081
 (0.0425) (0.0421)  (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 611 611 Observations 524 524 524 524
Regional FE YES YES Regional FE YES YES YES YES
   R squared 0.298 0.306 0.396 0.440
Control: population size, vaccine coverage, offline 
hate
Control: offline hate, marginalised area
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at regional level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; results hold removing 
crime rate and foreign population. Other potential confounders have been tested resulting never as significant predictors, 
including ageing index, population density, distance from closest refugees hosting centre, trust. See section 5.4 and Supple-
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these, following a well-established literature on 
non-linear models, we use a CF-TSRI approach. 
Our model has an interaction term involving 
inequality, which might be partially correlated 
with inequality itself. Following Wooldridge 
(2010), we deal with this introducing two 
reduced-form equations in the CF-TSRI esti-
mation. In both reduced-form equations, our 
chosen instrument is given by the Bartik-type 
instrument, that predicts the actual Gini index 
as a weighted average of national patterns of 
income growth (the ‘shift’ in the literature on 
Bartik-type instruments) using as weights the 
ith LLMA’s income distribution in 2001 (the 
‘shares’ in the literature on Bartik-type instru-
ments). The first reduced-form equation re-
gresses GINIi on the Bartik-type instrument, 
educated people, the interaction between the in-
strument and educated people and control vari-
ables. The resulting residuals are saved. Then, 
we regress the interaction term GINIi × EDUi  
on the Bartik-type instrument, educated 
people, the interaction between the instrument 
and educated people and control variables. As 
before, we save the residuals. Finally, the resid-
uals from both reduced-form equations are in-
cluded in the estimation of the structural-form 
equation, which is given by equation (3). Table 
3 shows the results of the CF-TSRI.
Column 1 reports the CF-TSRI estimates of 
the structural equation with non-meaningful 
covariates (crimes and foreign population) not 
included in the regression. All our main find-
ings are also confirmed after controlling for 
the potential endogeneity of income inequality 
(Supplementary Table A.11). The estimated 
coefficient for the Gini index is still positive 
and highly significant. Hence, high level of in-
come inequality in LLMAs determines high 
volume of online hate tweets. In fact, after ac-
counting for endogeneity the magnitude of the 
coefficient is even higher: a 1-p.p. increase in 
the Gini index implies a percentage change of 
more than 10% in hate tweets. The significance 
of the interaction between educated people 
and income inequality is also confirmed, as 
shown by the positive value for estimated co-
efficient for the interaction term. Therefore, in-
come inequality acts as a determinant for the 
volume of hate tweets through both a direct 
and an indirect effect, where the latter is chan-
nelled through the local endowment of human 
capital and summarised in Figure 2b. Figure 2b 
shows the marginal effect of an increase in the 
Gini index of income inequality on the share 
of hate tweets for different shares of local 
human capital endowments, confirming that 
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Figure 2. Income inequality and cyberhate: the effect of human capital. (a) Marginal effects of income inequality: 2PM model 
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increase the intensity of cyberhate for any 
level of inequality. Column 2 reports the esti-
mates from the reduced-form equations. The 
top section of column 2 describes the results 
of the reduced-form equation with Gini index 
as dependent variable. The bottom section 
presents the results of the other reduced-form 
equation with the interaction between the 
Gini index and educated people as the de-
pendent variable. Estimates from column 2 
show that the synthetic Gini index does pre-
dict the actual income inequality consistently 
with existing evidence on the positive growth 
of the Gini index for income inequality in 
Italy in our considered time span (Acciari and 
Mocetti, 2013). The F-tests for the exogenous 
regressors are above 10 for both reduced-form 
equations, suggesting that the instrument is 
not weak.
Discussion
Our findings show that each stage of the 2PM 
is associated with distinct risk factors, but—at 
Table 3. Estimates for the CF-TSRI approach applied to the stage 2 of the 2PM.
CF-TSRI 2PM stage 2:  
Structural-form equation  
(y = share of online hate)
CF-TSRI 2PM stage 2:  
Reduced-form equations
(1) (2)
 coef  coef
  a: direct effect (y = Gini index)
Educated people 0.319*** Educated people 0.0437***
 (0.0403)  (0.0046)
Gini index 10.28*** Synthetic Gini index 1.053***
 (2.577)  (0.261)
Educated people × Gini index 2.982** Educated people × Synthetic Gini index 0.197
 (0.940)  (0.117)
Incomplete stem family 2.301** Controls YES
(Non-Egalitarian) (0.567) Observations 524
Stem family (Non-Egalitarian) 3.344*** Regional FE YES
 (0.903) R squared 0.490
Communitarian family 2.987** F-stat ex instrument 16.21
(Egalitarian) (1.581)   
  b: interaction (y = educated people × Gini index)
Reduced eq residuals (direct effect) −6.421*** Educated people 0.076*
 (1.892)  (0.039)
  Synthetic Gini index 2.550
Reduced eq residuals (interaction) −1.179***  (2.318)
 (0.188) Educated people × Synthetic Gini index 0.258**
   (0.075)
Controls YES Controls YES
Observations 524 Observations 524
Regional FE YES Regional FE YES
R squared 0.458 R squared 0.126
  F-stat ex instrument 10.27
Control: offline hate, marginalised area Control: offline hate, marginalised area, family types
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the same time—local economic factors are a 
relevant dimension in influencing both stages. 
As for stage 1, namely the occurrence of on-
line hate, economic insecurity—measured by 
the share of workers who perceive their job to 
be precarious—is a significant predictor. This 
links to the ongoing debate on the high level 
of job insecurity characterising the Italian la-
bour market and its effects on people’s dis-
content (Boeri and Brandolini, 2005; Modena, 
Rondinelli and Sabatini, 2014; OECD, 2018), 
supporting existing findings on its role in pro-
moting discontent. Also, the transmission of 
social norms promoting inequality through 
family values acts as a risk factor for the oc-
currence of online hate. This result builds on 
the existing literature showing the importance 
of the family in shaping local social outcomes 
(Bertocchi et al., 2019; Duranton et al., 2009) 
including intolerance (Wilkinson et al., 2017), 
by adding evidence on its role in fostering 
online resentful behaviours. Finally, we find 
a small but significant association between 
cyberhate and voting for right-wing parties 
in agreement with existing works. This result 
seems to support the persistency of resent-
ment, showing that it also manifests itself in 
the everyday conversations on social media 
alongside at the ballot box as detailed in the 
literature on the geography of EU discontent 
(Dijkstra, Poelman and Rodríguez-Pose, 2019; 
Iammarino, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2019; 
Martin et al., 2018).
The results of the second stage of the 2PM, 
intensity of hate tweets, provide the evidence 
referring to our main research question, 
showing the relevant role of income inequality 
in fuelling cyberhate intensity. The estimates 
from the CF-TSRI model show that the influ-
ence of income inequality on the intensity of 
cyberhate holds when we account for the po-
tential endogeneity bias for income inequality, 
which could arise due to sorting of households 
to accommodate their preferences towards the 
public bad of intolerance. Our estimated effect 
for income inequality on cyberhate contrib-
utes to existing literature detailing how income 
inequality is a risk factor for violent discrim-
inative behaviours and anti-immigrant atti-
tudes (Burgoon et al., 2019; Elgar et al., 2013; 
Engler and Weisstanner, 2020; Kunst et  al., 
2017; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2017), adding evi-
dence on its effect on cyberhate. By showing 
the effect of inequality on a share of resent-
ment expressed on the internet, it also contrib-
utes to the literature about the spatial effects 
of inequality on discontent (Iammarino et al., 
2019; McCann, 2020; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). In 
this respect, our evidence shows that more un-
equal places suffer from more cyberhate, with 
no evidence on the effect of real and perceived 
inequality between places. The latter aspect de-
serves a proper investigation, that goes beyond 
the scope of the present paper, so to contribute 
to the debate on the ‘tale of two inequalities’ 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2020) and measuring the rela-
tive strength of interpersonal inequality and 
territorial inequality on cyberhate.
While our results on the direct effect of in-
equality seems in line with the literature, we 
also find that higher income inequality relates 
to cyberhate through its interaction with the 
local share of educated people, as shown by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the inter-
action term. This surprising finding can be ex-
plained referring to extant evidence depicting 
relevant country heterogeneity in the observed 
effect of education on hate (Finseraas, Skorge 
and Strøm, 2018; Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015; 
Weber, 2020). It can also be referred to other 
evidence highlighting that in some countries in-
equality triggers increased intolerance among 
higher educated people prompting the fear 
of losing status (Decelles and Norton, 2016; 
Jetten et al., 2017; Kunstman, Plant and Deska, 
2016; LeBlanc, Beaton and Walker, 2015). Our 
finding also parallels recent evidence from Italy 
on the strong negative stereotypes towards im-
migrants observed in the educated group of 
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that Italy has a sizeable level of income in-
equality compared to other countries.
Additionally, we provide two other 
interesting findings. First, we find that immi-
grants appear to be not relevant in shaping 
cyberhate. Second, crime does not emerge as 
a significant risk factor. These findings are con-
sistent with hate narratives that do not relate 
hate to actual crime or actual foreign popula-
tion, but rather define it as an expression of re-
sentment whose motivations reside elsewhere 
(Glaeser, 2005). Our evidence on foreign popu-
lation refers to findings from the literature on 
the geography of EU resentment, which details 
that the actual geography of migration does not 
appear to be a strong player in shaping voting 
for anti-EU parties (Dijkstra, Poelman and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2019). By showing that the ac-
tual outlook of immigrants do not relate to hate 
tweets against minorities, our findings also pro-
vide quantitative support to the experimental 
game evidence showing that inequality triggers 
fears capable of altering people’s perception of 
different ethnicities, to the point of believing 
that minority ethnic groups are far larger than 
they actual size (Krosch, Tyler and Amodio, 
2017; Kunst et al., 2017). Finally, our empirical 
investigation seems to suggest that trust and 
civic engagement do not exert any meaningful 
influence on cyberhate (detailed results can be 
found in Supplementary Tables A.4 and A.10). 
These results do not allow, however, us to con-
clude that social capital is ineffective in coun-
tering cyberhate, given the many dimensions in 
which it can be measured. A detailed investiga-
tion of the cyberhate/social capital nexus goes 
beyond the scope of the present paper, but it 
appears to deserve further investigation.
Overall, our findings improve the under-
standing of the real-world local determinants 
of digital resentment, contributing to the litera-
ture on the effect of the economic dimension 
on intolerant behaviours (Gerstenfeld, 2017; 
Hall, 2013; Stephan et al., 2000). They also sug-
gests that while the perception of job insecurity 
is enough for people to start tweeting hate, in-
equality is needed for hate tweets to increase in 
their volumes.
Postestimation diagnostics and 
robustness checks
The robustness of our results is assessed through 
several postestimation diagnostics and checks.
To account for a broad range of potential 
spatial triggers for intolerant behaviours we 
have considered different control variables, 
checking for their robustness as predictors by 
progressively including them into the 2PM 
model specification and subsequently testing 
the goodness-of-fit of the resulting estimates. 
Several tests have been performed to detect the 
most meaningful control covariates to be in-
cluded in the final 2PM and CF-TSRI specifica-
tions (likelihood ratio tests, Wald tests, contrast 
test, Akaike’s information criteria and Bayesian 
information criteria have been used to detect 
the potential core control variables; then, we 
have considered the postestimation diagnostics 
of all the regressions where the potential core 
control variables were fixed and combined with 
different sets of control variables).7 We present 
the postestimation diagnostics for CF-TSRI 
model, since this model specification also al-
lows to account for endogeneity of income 
inequality, hence conveying more informa-
tion about the relationship between cyberhate 
and our considered independent variables. 
Notably, the probit model of the stage 1 is the 
same for the CF-TSRI and the 2PM specifica-
tion, since it has no endogeneity issue relating 
to income inequality to be addressed. The re-
sults from the probit model hold also after re-
moving the biggest LLMAs and with province 
fixed effects (Supplementary Table A.5), as 
well as when population is removed from the 
covariates due to its correlation with the share 
of hate tweets (Supplementary Table A.3, 
Column 3). Multicollinearity does not appear 
to be an issue (average variance inflation factor 
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of goodness-of-fit and specification; it also dis-
plays outstanding discrimination in terms of 
sensitivity and specificity (see Supplementary 
Tables A.6 and A.7 and Supplementary Figure 
A.4). The log-linear model does not suffer from 
collinearity (average VIF  =  6.91) or omitted 
variables (Ramsey test: p-value = 0.4640). We 
tested the interactions between the Gini index 
and family types alongside the interaction be-
tween the Gini index and rural area, but none 
was significant. Results hold when province 
fixed effects are included instead of regional 
fixed effects (Table 4, column 1).8
We include several robustness checks specif-
ically targeting the zeros characterising our out-
come variable. Our main specification assumes 
that the zero values are true zeros. However, 
the observed zero might be observations for 
which the potential outcome is latent (Dow 
and Norton, 2003). To account for this, we esti-
mate an SSM (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) and 
discriminate between the 2PM and the SSM by 
assessing which model has the strongest pre-
dictive power (Dow et al., 2003; Madden, 2008; 
Santos-Silva et al., 2015). Our exclusion restric-
tion for the SSM is given by the share of popu-
lation above 70  years old over digital natives. 
In fact, ISTAT (2018) shows that nearly 91% of 
the population over 75 years old did not have 
access to the internet in 2017. Furthermore, 
Twitter statistics about the age profile of users 
in Italy highlights that the 96% of Twitter users 
are below 70  years old (Global Web Index, 
2015). This variable satisfies the condition for 
being an exclusion restriction (Cameron et al., 
2010),9 since the age profile considered in this 
case has an effect on tweet production, differ-
ently form the age cohorts which are relevant 
for the design on the instrumental variable for 
income inequality. Through two-step procedure 
it is possible to get consistent and robust es-
timates (Greene, 2003; Leung et  al., 1996; 
Wooldridge, 2010) with error clustered at spa-
tial level (for a detailed discussion and results, 
see Supplementary Tables A.12 and A.13). 
Comparing the predictive power between the 
2PM and the SSM, the former is confirmed as 
the preferred specification (see Supplementary 
Table A.16), although results between the two 
models are similar. Alongside the nature of 
zeros in the outcome variable, also their magni-
tude represents a feature worth considering in 
choosing the proper modelling strategy. In this 
regard, results from the 2PM and the SSM are 
compared with results from a single-stage OLS 
model where the zeros are assumed not to be 
a cause for concern (see Supplementary Table 
A.14 and Supplementary Table A.15 for de-
tailed estimates). The single-stage OLS displays 
the lowest predictive power among competing 
model specifications (see Supplementary Table 
A.16), but still confirms our main findings.
Finally, we also consider a different normal-
isation for our dependent variable, dividing 
by all the resident population in each LLMA. 
Again, our main results are confirmed (see 
Supplementary Table A.15 and A.17).
Conclusions
Cyberhate is spreading quickly raising con-
cerns among researchers, policy makers and the 
general population. Its diffusion is prompting 
more investigations into its determinants. This 
paper empirically identifies a causal relation-
ship between income inequality and cyberhate 
in the case of Italy. Income inequality is capable 
of producing cyberhate through both a direct 
and an indirect effect. The latter linked the 
local share of educated people.
Our study has interesting implications for 
both theory and policy. From a theoretical per-
spective, our findings are consistent with, and 
contribute to, the literature acknowledging 
that cyberhate does not happen in a spatial 
vacuum (Hall, 2013), also adding cyberhate 
to other intolerant attitudes that are deter-
mined by economic inequality (Martin et  al., 
2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; McCann, 2020; 
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Table 4. Estimates for the CF-TSRI approach applied to the stage 2 of the 2PM in several robustness checks (province fixed 
effects in column 1; removing outlier in column 2).
CF-TSRI 2PM stage 2: Structural-form equation (y = share of online hate)
(1) Province FE coef (2) No outlier coef
Educated people 0.379*** Educated people 0.238**
 (0.102)  (0.119)
Gini index 9.724*** Gini index 7.320***
 (2.836)  (1.701)
Educated people × Gini index 3.784*** Educated people × Gini index 2.638***
 (0.997)  (0.069)
Incomplete stem 6.902*** Incomplete stem 1.943***
Family (Non-Egalitarian) (1.045) Family (Non-Egalitarian) (0.420)
Stem Family (Non-Egalitarian) 6.644*** Stem family (Non-Egalitarian) 1.444**
 (0.802)  (0.637)
Communitarian — communitarian 3.045**
Family (Egalitarian)  family (Egalitarian) (1.333)
Reduced eq residuals −1.055*** Reduced eq residuals −3.648**
(direct effect) (0.284) (direct effect) (1.695)
Reduced eq residuals −1.395*** Reduced eq residuals −1.596**
(interaction) (0.112) (interaction) (0.698))
Controls YES Controls YES
Observations 524 Observations 523
Province FE YES Regional FE YES
R squared 0.588 R squared 0.454
Control: offline hate, marginalised area 
CF-TSRI 2PM stage 2: Reduced-form equations
a: direct effect (y = Gini index)
Educated people 0.043*** educated people 0.0423***
 (0.005)  (0.004)
Synthetic Gini index 0.544** Synthetic Gini index 1.029***
 (0.014)  (0.264)
Educated people × Gini index 0.096 Educated people × Gini index 0.182
 (0.156)  (0.116)
Controls YES Controls YES
Observations 524 Observations 523
Province FE YES Regional FE YES
R squared 0.559 R squared 0.462
F-stat ex instrument 12.04 F-stat ex instrument 15.14
b: interaction (y = educated people × Gini index)
Educated people 0.083** Educated people 0.068*
 (0.027)  (0.038)
Synthetic Gini index 1.377 Synthetic Gini index 2.631
 (1.840)  (2.030)
Educated people × Gini index 0.416*** Educated people × Gini index 0.324***
 (0.051)  (0.063)
Controls YES Controls YES
Observations 524 Observations 523
Regional FE YES Regional FE YES
R squared 0.173 R squared 0.0746
F-stat ex instrument 11.02 F-stat ex instrument 10.52
Control: offline hate, marginalised area, family types.
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explore how different aspects of income in-
equality influence cyberhate, for instance by 
considering the effects of income distances 
between the affluent, the middle class and the 
poor. Another interesting avenue for further 
research could be assessing another dimension 
of inequality, namely territorial inequality, to 
contribute to the research on the relative in-
fluence of interpersonal inequality and spatial 
inequality.
We also find that persistent social norms 
pivoting around inequality and self-centred-
ness play a role in the creation of cyberhate. 
Local social norms are capable of influencing 
resentful behaviours alongside other relevant 
socioeconomic features already identified by 
the literature (Bertocchi et al., 2019; Duranton 
et al., 2009). Additionally, we also provide evi-
dence on the role of economic insecurity acting 
as a risk factor for online hate, relating to re-
cent findings identifying a relationship between 
economic insecurity and populism (Guiso 
et al., 2017). Overall, the findings of the paper 
provide further support to the association be-
tween economic anxiety and behaviours against 
minority groups.
Our findings have implications for the 
thriving policy debate on countering cyberhate. 
The evidence provided in the paper clearly 
shows that policy initiatives aiming at reducing 
the level of income inequality can contribute to 
countering social anxiety, as expressed through 
cyberhate. Hence, our findings provide support 
to the policy approaches which do not focus 
entirely on banning content publication which 
collides with freedom of expression rights. 
Moreover, addressing the factors that trigger 
cyberhate would allow to overcome the sev-
eral shortcomings which are affecting the ex-
isting bulk of policy initiatives. Currently, the 
main policy focus is on improving commitment 
and accountability of internet service pro-
viders, social media platforms and digital users 
(ElSherief et  al., 2018). This approach suffers 
from prosecutions vagaries, that dampen the 
deterrence effect, and from the cheap and fast 
relocation of hate contents in more favour-
able jurisdictions that prevents prosecution 
(McGonagle, 2013). Another policy implica-
tion suggested by our results is that, in Italy, 
people’s perception of social injustice has not 
been countered by the existing social programs, 
aligning with existing analysis on the effective-
ness of existing policy frameworks to counter 
resentment (Iammarino et al., 2019).
We note the limitations of this study. Clearly 
our findings refer to Italy, hence there are issues 
regarding their generalisation to other contexts. 
Future research should broaden the geographical 
scope of the analysis to assess whether inequality 
acts as a determinant for online hate more 
widely. Moreover, the focus of our investigation 
is online hate generated and diffused through 
Twitter. Other social networks such as Youtube 
and Facebook, as well as the dark web, repre-
sent relevant online media through which digital 
hatemongers operate, although being charac-
terised by an architecture which does not easily 
allow for extensive geo-tagged data extraction.
Supplementary material
Supplementary data are available at Cambridge 






3 In the robustness checks, we estimate another nor-
malisation given by hate tweets per capita.
4 Some covariates that have not proved to be sig-
nificant are omitted for readability issues: robberies, 
homicides, thefts, usury, and gambling machines per 
inhabitants.
5 For a detailed description of the design of instru-
ment, see Valderrama and Rodriguez-Castelan 
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6 We have tested other interactions for income in-
equality: trust, foreign population, crime perception 
of job insecurity to find non significance.
7 More details are provided in Supplementary Tables 
A.4 and A.9–A.10, and Supplementary Table A.18 
also shows the correlation matrix.
8 The results are also robust to the exclusion of out-
liers. In fact, the data show a mild outlier corres-
ponding to the LLM ‘Petralia Sottana’, located in 
Sicily, where the geo-located dataset of online hate 
tweets allocates a surprisingly high number of tweets 
(see also Supplementary Figure A.5). The estimation 
of the log-linear fitted model removing the outlier 
do not change the results, as displayed in Table 4, 
column 2.
9 Other potential exclusion restrictions have been 
tested, such as broadband connectivity and 3G 
connectivity, but they do not satisfy the necessary 
conditions.
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